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Introduction 4 
In September 2015, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were announced at a 5 
summit of the United Nations (UN) in New York.1 Comprising numerous social, economic 6 
and environmental policy objectives, these followed the Millennium Development Goals of 7 
2000-2015, in which public health targets had figured prominently.  While continuing earlier 8 
concerns with reducing infectious diseases and child mortality, a novel feature of the SDGs 9 
was Target 3.8: 10 
‘Achieve universal health coverage, including financial risk protection, access to 11 
quality essential health-care services and access to safe, effective, quality and 12 
affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all.’ 2 13 
Not only did this prioritize health systems on the UN agenda, it also emphasized 14 
universalism, in a way rarely seen since the ‘Health For All’ drive of the World Health 15 
Organization (WHO) in the 1970s. 3  16 
 17 
What exactly does the target of universal health coverage (UHC) imply?  ‘Coverage’ is a term 18 
deriving from the insurance industry, but proponents of UHC stress that it may also refer to 19 
tax-based health security. 4  Equally, ‘universal’ has never straightforwardly signified the 20 
whole population. For example, an early usage, from Germany in 1882, referred to the 21 
‘universal adoption of sickness insurance’ in respect of Bismarck’s scheme to compel only 22 
the industrial workforce to join sick funds. 5 Such definitional ambiguities have cued an 23 
impassioned debate amongst today’s global health community about how UHC should be 24 
operationalized in low and middle income countries.  Latin America is a particular focus of 25 
controversy.  Some advocate the approach of ‘structured pluralism’, with insurance as the 26 
main medium of cover, and the state’s role as regulator rather than provider.  Others argue 27 
that the priority must be universal health care as a basic human right, and that statist single-28 
payer systems are best placed to deliver this. 6   29 
 30 
This is not the first time that the issue of universal rights to health services has generated 31 
debate in the international arena.  This article discusses an earlier episode, centered on the 32 
 2 
Philadelphia Declaration of the International Labour Organization (ILO) in 1944.  The ILO was 33 
originally an autonomous agency of the League of Nations, founded in the aftermath of 34 
World War I with the ‘protection of the worker against sickness, disease and injury arising 35 
out of his employment’ amongst its constitutional goals. 7 The ILO’s methods included an 36 
annual conference at which optimal standards, initially drafted by its officials, were debated 37 
and agreed.  These were written into Conventions, which states were asked to ratify, or 38 
Recommendations, which were advisory and non-binding.  States were then offered advice 39 
and information on how to develop appropriate  legislation. 8 40 
 41 
The Philadelphia Declaration was propounded in the latter stages of World War II, when the 42 
ILO had fled Geneva for the safety of Montreal, Canada. It set out a vision of basic political 43 
and economic rights for working people in the postwar settlement.  These encompassed the 44 
full gamut of social security arrangements available in more advanced welfare states, 45 
including the right to sickness benefit and ‘comprehensive medical care’. 9 In the 46 
Recommendation that elaborated the main text, a universalist intent was specified. Health 47 
services were for ‘all members of the community, whether or not they are gainfully 48 
occupied’; if under a social insurance system, the uninsured would have the same right to 49 
care ‘pending their inclusion’; if under a state public health service, then ‘all beneficiaries 50 
should have an equal right’ to care, without qualifying conditions or means-testing. 10 Once 51 
peace was achieved, debate began on how these ideals could be translated into a 52 
Convention and hence into action by member states.  The outcome, in 1952, was a bitter 53 
disappointment to champions of the Declaration, for the text that was finally agreed had so 54 
diluted the standards required for ratification that the original goals were lost.   55 
 56 
The aim in what follows is to describe and explain this earlier rise and fall of UHC as a goal in 57 
international health policy.  How and why did it come onto the agenda, and why was it 58 
ultimately unsuccessful?  Conceptually, we follow scholars of international organizations 59 
(IOs) who find the key to understanding change in the tensions between the authority of the 60 
member states and the autonomous actions of the agencies themselves. 11  Within this 61 
literature is a spectrum of emphasis. Some argue that the interests of the most powerful 62 
nations are always the dominant forces in international engagement, and that IOs exert no 63 
supra-national authority over the anarchic behavior of individual states, each in ‘a struggle 64 
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for power’.12  Others stress the global issues that compel states towards interdependence, 65 
fostering independent bureaucracies and transnational networks of expertise through which 66 
IOs formulated and shaped policy distinct from the goals of national actors. 13   67 
 68 
Our explanation falls somewhere between these poles.  The powers delegated to the ILO’s 69 
bureaucracy at its foundation, and the internationalist nature of early welfare state 70 
development, encouraged its increasing advocacy of health coverage under social 71 
insurance.  However, the weakness of the League of Nations system meant that the ILO 72 
lacked authority, and its early work in this field was Eurocentric and of limited achievement.  73 
In the late 1930s and 1940s a temporary concordance between ILO experts and policy-74 
makers in Britain and America informed planning for more comprehensive health cover 75 
under social security.  However, with the advent of peace, the Cold War, and the impending 76 
end of colonialism the positions of the member states became too divided to sustain the 77 
ILO’s ambitious vision.    78 
 79 
First, we focus on the interwar period, establishing the international context of  80 
health policy-making within incipient state welfare schemes, then identifying the themes, 81 
networks and individuals whose intellectual groundwork underlay the Philadelphia 82 
Declaration’s medical sections.  We next describe the debates between officials and 83 
member states prior to, and following, the Declaration, then advance our explanation for its 84 
failure, blending issues of ideology, practicality and realpolitik.  We close with reflection on 85 
how this history speaks to the present juncture.  Our method is documentary research in 86 
the Geneva archives of the ILO, the League of Nations Health Organization and the WHO, 87 
including conference proceedings, journals, committee records, correspondence and office 88 
files. 89 
 90 
Towards Philadelphia: the interwar context 91 
The circumstances of the ILO’s establishment at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 were 92 
conducive to innovative thought about social security.  Britain, France and the United States 93 
took the leading role in its creation, at a time when each was preoccupied with labour 94 
unrest at home and abroad.  In particular, the Russian Revolution encouraged politicians to 95 
create a Western foil to Bolshevism, in which representatives of workers, employers and 96 
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governments would convene to address the injustices that otherwise provoked conflict. 14  97 
The delegation of responsibilities for social goals to the ILO therefore had a legitimation 98 
function, but it also responded to the spread of socialist or social democratic ideas, and the 99 
softening of laissez-faire principles within liberalism, as in French solidarisme, British New 100 
Liberalism and American Progressivism.   101 
 102 
The context in which the ILO’s thinking occurred was one of expanding entitlements to 103 
health services within prominent nation states.  Prior to the 1880s, individuals outside the 104 
medical marketplace resorted either to poor laws or charity, or joined mutual sickness 105 
funds, sometimes regulated or subsidized by governments.  A fundamental break came in 106 
Germany, with Bismarckian social insurance against sickness (1883), accidents (1884) old 107 
age and disability (1889).  This mandated employer contribution to sick funds; it compelled 108 
participation of substantial sections of the working class, thus creating large general risk 109 
pools; and it introduced (initially through accident insurance) the principle of no-fault 110 
liability, so that risk was removed from the individual and managed collectively using 111 
actuarial mathematics. 15  The national health insurance (NHI) approach was taken up in the 112 
territories of Austria-Hungary, whose constituent nations retained and extended it on 113 
gaining independence following World War One.  Britain adopted a variant in 1911, and 114 
France in 1930. The Soviet Union’s Constitution enshrined a public health system in 1917, 115 
though implementation awaited stability in the 1920s. 16 In the liberal democracies, the first 116 
constitution pledging ‘a comprehensive system of insurance … to maintain health’ as a right 117 
of citizenship was that of Germany’s Weimar Republic (1919). 17 The United States 118 
considered, then rejected, NHI proposals placed before state legislatures in the 1910s, and 119 
did so again when mooted by New Dealers for the Social Security Bill in 1934-5, though 120 
some Latin American nations, such as Chile adopted it (1924). 18  More radically, New 121 
Zealand’s Labour government pioneered a state national health service in 1938. 19  122 
 123 
This early welfare state building was inherently internationalist, for contemporary policy-124 
makers frequently employed foreign comparison and borrowing.  Bismarck had been 125 
inspired by French Emperor Louis Napoleon’s regulation of mutual funds, while both Britain 126 
and France borrowed from Germany, their upstart competitor. 20  American Progressives 127 
reported on England and Germany and deployed international comparison in reform 128 
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propaganda. 21 New Zealanders sought to surpass British NHI, while the Soviet Union (which 129 
joined the ILO in 1934) attracted much observer interest as an ideal type. 22 In sum, then, 130 
the officials of League organizations and their constituent representatives would have been 131 
well aware of health policy-making as a common and active endeavor across the member 132 
states, albeit with much national variation.   133 
  134 
Within this context, discussion of access to health services came formally onto the ILO’s 135 
agenda in 1927.  One route was through the League of Nations Health Organization (LNHO).  136 
This separate agency of the League had originated as its Provisional Health Committee 137 
(1921), to address its Covenant obligations for the control and prevention of disease.  Its 138 
activities included establishing a global surveillance network, collating comparative health 139 
metrics, developing the International Classification of Diseases, and providing technical 140 
assistance, for example in Greece and China. 23 Several of its leading figures were from 141 
Central European countries and advocates of social medicine, such as the Polish 142 
bacteriologist Ludwik Rajchman, and the Yugoslav professor of hygiene, Andrija Stampar.  It 143 
was another successor state, Czechoslovakia, that first requested the LNHO to advise on a 144 
problem common to nations developing social health insurance.  How should this work 145 
alongside public health agencies, that were typically funded by the local state to deal with  146 
tuberculosis and infant health? 24  Behind this question lay issues of entitlement and the 147 
irrationality of systems relying partly on general taxation and partly on individual insurance.  148 
A Joint LNHO/ILO committee was convened to consider this, chaired by Sir George Newman, 149 
the British Chief Medical Officer, a mainstream liberal.  Unsurprisingly it backed away from 150 
recommending formal integration, in favor of less rigid consultative councils. 25    151 
 152 
The second area of action was the ILO’s Sickness Insurance (Industry) Convention of 1927.  153 
Ratifying nations agreed to establish compulsory sickness insurance for workers in industry 154 
and commerce, principally through self-governing non-profit institutions funded by 155 
employees and employers. 26 Various exceptions were permitted to the occupations 156 
covered, deductibles and qualifying periods were allowed, and the state’s contribution was 157 
determined nationally.  Ten years on only fifteen member states had ratified: Germany, 158 
Hungary, Luxembourg (1928); Austria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania, Latvia (1929); 159 
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Bulgaria (1930); Great Britain, Chile, Lithuania (1931); Spain (1932); Uruguay and Colombia 160 
(1933). 27  161 
 162 
The nature of the Convention, and the predominance of Central European states amongst 163 
the early signatories illuminates the proactive role of key ILO staff, who now keenly  164 
advocated a German, Bismarckian, model of NHI. This arose partly from the ‘privileged 165 
representation’ of German experts in the ILO’s Correspondence Committee on Social 166 
Security.28  Also important were two ILO officials, Adrien Tixier, a disabled French war 167 
veteran who headed the Social Insurance Section, and his Czech deputy, Osvald Stein, who 168 
had earlier overseen unemployment insurance in Austria. 29  Both were prominent in 169 
establishing the International Conference of National Unions of Mutual Benefit Societies 170 
and Sickness Insurance Funds (predecessor of the International Social Security Association), 171 
whose title acknowledged the differing French and German approaches. 30  Chaired by a 172 
Czech politician and ILO official, Leo Winter, they used this as a ‘propaganda tool’ in the 173 
international promotion of social insurance.31   174 
 175 
International advocacy for the expansion of NHI by ILO figures became more urgent during 176 
the Depression.  A LNHO memorandum of 1932 by German Health Section official Otto 177 
Olsen argued this was a humanitarian and political necessity, for insecurity could foster the 178 
extremism exemplified by Hitler. 32 These themes were echoed in 1933, by a new ILO/LNHO 179 
expert committee considering ‘the best methods of safeguarding public health during the 180 
depression’.  Chaired by Georges Cahen-Salvador, an expert on Bismarckian insurance and 181 
active promoter of NHI in France, the committee included other leaders of European social 182 
medicine, such as Jacques Parisot, Franz Goldmann, Winter and Stampar. 33  Its conclusion 183 
was that ‘…compulsory sickness insurance must be regarded as the most appropriate and 184 
rational method of organizing the protection of the working classes…’. 34  Tixier too became 185 
bolder, dismissing earlier objections that broadening entitlements to dependent family 186 
members would damage private medicine, and frankly asserting the inadequacy of 187 
‘individual saving, public assistance, and voluntary insurance’ for achieving social security.  188 
Instead, ‘compulsory social insurance … is the most scientific and the most effective 189 
means’.35  While still hesitant about recommending a ’public medical service’ for ‘the whole 190 
population of the country’, he felt it ‘fairly safe to say’ that ‘State intervention’ in 191 
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combination with NHI made this direction inevitable. 36  Thus, by 1939 an ILO position was 192 
discernible that yoked modernist tropes of science and rationality to a vision of progressive 193 
advance. 194 
 195 
Towards the Philadelphia Declaration 196 
From this base, a more radical position was adopted in 1944.  Why? Partly the answer lies 197 
with the changing international context and the publication of two influential documents in 198 
1942.  One was Britain’s Beveridge report. ILO officials had contributed evidence to this, 199 
although they felt their influence was doubtful compared to the ‘strong movement in the 200 
trade unions and among the private “planners”’ favoring the radical developments in New 201 
Zealand. 37  Beveridge’s vision of a universal, comprehensive social security system captured 202 
the war-weary public imagination at home, inspired exiled French and Scandinavian 203 
politicians in London, and quickly circulated the Anglophone world. 38  In North America, the 204 
National Resources Planning Board report, Security, Work and Relief Policies, was also 205 
significant for broaching a universalist language. 39  For example, both documents, and the 206 
New Zealand innovations, shaped thinking in Canada, the ILO’s temporary home, where the 207 
Marsh Report (1943) proposed full employment, social security and health insurance against 208 
‘universal risks’. 40   209 
 210 
The importance of British and American social thought also reflected changing networks of 211 
expertise and influence that followed Europe’s disintegration and the ILO’s flight West in 212 
1940. 41 Advisers from the Roosevelt administration now came centre stage in the ILO’s 213 
consultative work, for having drawn heavily on European precedents in making New Deal 214 
legislation they could now offer America’s own experience. 42 In addition, with the 215 
introduction of the first Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill seeking to implement federal health 216 
insurance in the United States (1943), new questions arose about how international 217 
recommendations would accommodate an American model.  Also to the fore came Latin 218 
American officials, building on networks which Stein had developed through an Inter-219 
American conference and the Declaration of Santiago de Chile (1942), which outlined a 220 
social security program and technical assistance arrangements.43   221 
 222 
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The adoption of more radical elements of British policy also followed changes within the ILO 223 
bureaucracy in 1943, following Stein’s accidental death and Tixier’s departure to the Free 224 
French.  Maurice Stack now headed the Social Insurance Section, but of more central 225 
importance was Laura Bodmer. An Anglo-German economist with a PhD from Zurich in 226 
British trade unionism, Bodmer joined the ILO as a statistician in 1925, moving to the 227 
Section in 1932, where she increasingly specialized in ‘des questions medico-sociales’. 44  228 
She took main responsibility for drafting sections on medical aspects of social security for 229 
the Declaration, creating then amending texts in a balancing act between ILO goals and 230 
member state wishes.   231 
 232 
This process began with a major consultation in July 1943, convening luminaries like 233 
Britain’s William Beveridge, American New Deal experts Isidore Falk, Arthur Altmeyer and 234 
George Perrott, Canadian NHI planner Leonard Marsh, and Latin American politicians Miguel 235 
Etchebarne (Chile) and Edgarde Rebagliati (Peru).  Bodmer’s draft proposed a health plan 236 
covering ‘all individuals whether or not gainfully occupied’ and comprehensive in form, 237 
providing ‘all care required for the restoration, conservation and promotion of health’.45 Her 238 
preferred option was a ‘public general service’ financed by general or special taxation; the 239 
alternative was contributory social insurance supported by taxation for individuals unable to 240 
pay. 46  In the ensuing discussions, American delegates like Falk repositioned the ‘general 241 
medical service’ as a longer-range ‘ultimate objective’ achievable incrementally through 242 
different paths, rather than by forcing nations into a ‘common mold’. 47  The agreed text was 243 
debated at the International Labour Conference (ILC) in Philadelphia, where it was 244 
embraced by a vote of 76 to 6. 48  Amongst abstainers were was the US government, whose 245 
employer delegates disapproved, and the UK government, resistant to intrusion into its 246 
colonial sphere of influence. 247 
 248 
Diluting the Convention, 1949-52 249 
Against the backdrop of reconstruction, and the creation of the UN, the ILO now worked 250 
towards a Convention that would implement the vision of 1944.  Formal decisions were 251 
taken at its annual conferences, with consultations in the interim.  Retreat from the 252 
Recommendation that accompanied the Declaration was first obvious at the 1951 ILC.  After 253 
debating a draft convention, it was decided that ratification could be for either ‘minimum’ 254 
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or ‘advanced’ standards. 49  Dilution went further at the 1952 ILC when the Convention was 255 
finally approved.  Ratifying members needed only implement three out of the nine specified 256 
branches of social security, and could thus omit medical insurance altogether. 50 In addition, 257 
low-income nations could claim temporary exemptions to even these obligations.  In place 258 
of compulsion the place of voluntary insurance was accepted, and the principle of state 259 
subsidy rejected.  The notion of advanced standards to which richer ratifying nations should 260 
subscribe was also dropped. 51    261 
 262 
Four explanations can be suggested for this outcome.  First, was the pragmatic concern of 263 
low-income countries about the requirements of the Declaration.  The need to distinguish 264 
minimum and advanced standards was evident to Latin American member states 265 
contemplating the extension of social security to rural populations.  Given their lack of 266 
resources they would have to retreat from universalism and comprehensiveness, and 267 
instead ‘…try to extend, as soon as possible, to the greatest number of persons, within the 268 
possibilities of each country, social security medical services, or other appropriate 269 
methods…’. 52  It was newly independent India which proposed the idea of permitted 270 
exclusions, considering even the ‘minimum standards’ too demanding for a country whose 271 
population was highly dispersed and largely rural. 53  To some extent these difficulties arose 272 
from the mostly Eurocentric precedents in ILO thinking about welfare, but they may also 273 
reflect the fissures within the early UN over the nature of internationalism under late-274 
colonialism.  Although representatives from Latin America, China, the USSR and India 275 
envisaged the supervisory role of the UN system displacing colonial prerogatives, the 276 
imperial powers, with some support from the United States, were broadly successful in 277 
preserving ‘a world safe for empire’ in the new dispensation. 54  This was hardly conducive 278 
to generalizing Western models of health security to poorer nations. 279 
 280 
Second, opposition was articulated by hostile business and medical interest groups.  281 
Employers’ representatives inveighed against the proposals in intemperate language: it was 282 
a ‘monstrosity’; a ‘Utopian’ project; it augured ‘socialisation … destruction’; it would extend 283 
the ‘all-embracing tentacles’ of the state.  Above all it was beyond the ILO’s sphere of 284 
competence. 55 Physicians also expressed their discontent, following the launch in 1947 of 285 
the World Medical Association (WMA), aided by funding from US pharmaceutical firms. As 286 
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in national debates, objections emphasized patients’ freedom of choice, and doctors’ rights 287 
to diagnose, treat and charge as they saw fit. The underlying agenda though, was to defend 288 
the profession’s status and market position. 56  289 
 290 
Third, was the well-documented marginalization of social medicine in postwar international 291 
health. 57 The ILO had initially hoped that the newly created WHO would endorse and 292 
support the proposals.  Yet while its constitution proclaimed the human right to ‘the highest 293 
attainable standard of health’, its founding article on ‘strengthening health services’ 294 
pledged only assistance ‘upon request’. 58 Nonetheless, in 1951 a joint WHO/ILO consultant 295 
group was formed to address the draft convention, containing leading social medicine 296 
exponents like Henry Sigerist and René Sand.  Its statement backed the ILO position, 297 
favoring inter alia universal coverage where possible, services free from means-testing or 298 
cost-sharing, remuneration by salary as optimal, unified national administration and 299 
regionally integrated hospitals and clinics. 59 The WHO’s Executive Board immediately 300 
distanced itself from this, while the WMA claimed the ‘vast majority’ of physicians 301 
disagreed. 60 By now WHO policy was moving firmly towards big, ‘vertical’ interventions 302 
against infectious diseases, due both to faith in biotechnical solutions like vaccines and 303 
pesticides, and to baser geopolitical considerations. 61 Health systems work merited only a 304 
‘study and report’ brief.   305 
 306 
Finally, the position of the United States, as the key funder of the UN and now the leading 307 
world power, was crucial.  The attempts of the Truman administration to legislate for NHI 308 
had been roundly defeated, not least due to a vituperative and well-funded campaign by the 309 
American Medical Association (in which WMA council members Louis Bauer and Morris 310 
Fishbein were prominent). 62 As AJPH readers will know, moderate New Deal progressives 311 
were then tarnished by character assassination, while more radical health internationalists 312 
endured a McCarthyite purge. 63  Faced with this domestic context, it became impossible for 313 
America to support a universalist health services agenda on the world stage.  Such 314 
considerations would remain matters for national jurisdiction.   315 
 316 
Conclusion 317 
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This account of the early rise and fall of UHC illustrates the capacity of international 318 
organizations to exercise some autonomous agency.  Building health systems within proto-319 
welfare states was always a supra-national endeavor, since no country, even Bismarck’s 320 
Germany, was immune from the diffusion of ideas and policy-learning.  National 321 
experiences fostered communities of experts willing to serve in international bodies, though 322 
external events could determine which regions and ideas dominated at different times, and 323 
epistemic communities could be oppositional as well as supportive.  Responsible officers 324 
within organizations were similarly conditioned by prior experiences, but they also sought a 325 
creative and proactive role in directing policy, beyond simply reacting to the perceived 326 
position of member states.  327 
 328 
In this case though, the arc of the story was determined by the willingness of powerful 329 
member states to delegate authority to the ILO.  Health system reform to universalize 330 
single-payer or NHI models has never been uncontentious, touching as it does on the 331 
material concerns of vested interests, and on core beliefs about equity and individualism.  332 
Once the idealistic ardor of wartime cooled, national interests disrupted the apparent 333 
consensus.  Low-income countries sought acknowledgement that poverty drastically 334 
constrained ambition, and into this breach it was easy for opponents to ride, depleting 335 
commitments until they were worthless.  Colonial calculations played some part in Britain’s 336 
reluctance, and Cold War polarities helped determine the American position, in which 337 
‘socialized’ medicine was now anathema.  The new global superpower would not endorse a 338 
position unacceptable within its own national polity. 339 
 340 
How might this history speak to the present?  Of course, much has changed in the interim.  341 
The movement for ‘selective primary health care’ from the 1980s narrowed the meaning of 342 
universalism to entitlement to a limited number of services of proven cost-effectiveness.  At 343 
the same time, the constraints exercised by powerful member states have been offset by 344 
the proliferation, since the 1990s, of philanthropic foundations and public/private actors 345 
that can set agendas unfettered by national governments. However, some parallels remain. 346 
Then as now, the goal of universalism was politically controversial, with today’s ‘structured 347 
pluralism’ bearing some affinity to the incremental advance that Americans like Falk 348 
advocated between 1938 and 1950.  Today’s champions of universal health care may also 349 
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trace their genealogy to progressive social medicine advocates of the mid-century.  The 350 
recurrent nature of this debate prompts challenging questions.  How far should idealists 351 
stifle their objections and work with pragmatists to exploit opportunities which were missed 352 
before?  Where are the oppositional networks of today, and how can they be addressed, so 353 
that vested interests do not impede the honoring of human rights? 64  What examples of 354 
best practice can be advanced, to better address the pragmatic objections of poor 355 
countries, so that unlike in 1949-52, these do not become a wedge to forestall change? 65 356 
And what will be the leadership role of the United States, at a time when its own domestic 357 
health politics, and the nationalist sentiments circulating amongst its electorate, also echo 358 
the early-1950s?   359 
 360 
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